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 ARTICLE: MISPLACED FEAR, HOW PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WILL NOT 
CRUMBLE IN THE FACE OF COMPELLING DISCOVERY UNDER § 1782(A) 
By 




Expeditious proceedings and low costs provide the foundations of the international 
arbitral process.1 However, lower costs regarding the discovery process in international 
arbitration have become a hotly debated issue over the last two decades. Despite the desire 
of United States courts to stay out of the arbitral process to avoid creating the delays seen 
in the United States judicial system, the need for court involvement in private international 
arbitration is becoming an unavoidable necessity.2  
This article explores the reasons why parties engaged in private international 
arbitration should be permitted to compel discovery in district courts through the use of 28 
U.S.C. § 1782(a).3 Section 1782(a) permits a district court to compel a party who resides 
within its jurisdiction to produce documents to be used in “a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal” after “the application of any interested person.”4 Given the recent 
decisions by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, it is unclear 
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) encompasses arbitral panels and organizations within its 
meaning.5 The first section of this article provides a brief background on the history, 
current dispute, and potential outcomes of a decision in favor of and against allowing 28 
U.S.C. § 1782(a) to compel discovery. The second section provides background to explain 
the appellate court decisions and how the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. furthered the argument on both sides.6 The third and final 
 
*  Keenan Rambo is the Articles Section Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at Penn State Law. 
1. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 38-39 
(5th ed. 2018) (noting that businesses involved in arbitration are fond of the process because it “represents . 
. . [an] expeditious way for resolving their disputes.”). 
2. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & HENRY ALLEN BLAIR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE, 13 (8th ed. 2019) (“The federal decisional law seeks to maintain the systemic autonomy of 
arbitration[] . . . . The aggressive judicial protection of arbitration is meant to eliminate dilatory tactics.”). 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020).  
4. Id. 
5. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. 
v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 719-
23 (6th Cir. 2019); contra Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020); Hanwei 
Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec., 965 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2020). 
6. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (“‘[t]he term 
“tribunal” . . . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial 
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section of this article will present an analysis on why Section 1782(a) should be available 
for foreign arbitration tribunals and parties. This final section discusses how Section 
1782(a) encompasses private international arbitration, why differing discovery processes 
between domestic and international arbitration are irrelevant, and how reading Section 
1782(a) in this fashion aligns with Congress's and the Supreme Court’s national policy. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: THE PURPOSE, CONTROVERSY, AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF 
DECISIONS FOR AND AGAINST SECTION 1782(A) 
 
Section 1782(a) allows a district court to order a party within its jurisdiction to 
produce documents after receiving a request from an interested party.7 Congress first 
enacted Section 1782(a) in 1948 in an attempt to aid transnational proceedings.8 The last 
fundamental change to Section 1782(a) occurred in 1964 when Congress adopted the broad 
language “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”9  
Congress adopting this new phrasing has served to cause confusion and 
disagreement among the Courts of Appeal.10 The disagreement stems from different 
interpretations of statutory history and whether Congress intended for the phrase “foreign 
or international tribunals” to encompass arbitration panels as “tribunals.”11The Second, 
Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted several different rationales to 
explain why Section 1782(a) should not encompass arbitration panels. The first argument 
posed by these appellate courts is that statutory interpretation does not support including 
arbitration within the term “tribunal.”12 The second argument raised is that Congress would 
 
agencies . . . .’”) (quoting Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1015, 1026-27 (1965))) [hereinafter Smit, International Litigation].  
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020). 
8. See generally, Hagit Muriel Elul & Rebeca E. Mosquera, 28 U.S.C. Section 1782: U.S. Discovery in Aid 
of International Arbitration Proceedings, in International Arbitration in the United States 393, 394-395 
(2017). 
9. See Sec. 9(a), § 1782, 78 Stat. at 997. It should also be noted that Congress did make minor changes to 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1996, however, these changes only added clarification that the statute may be used in 
criminal proceedings and are irrelevant as to the scope of this article.  
10. See, e.g., Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 215-16; Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 717-18; 
contra Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 694-95; Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 103. 
11.  See, e.g., Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693 (“[T]he word ‘tribunal’ is not defined in the statute, and 
dictionary definitions do not unambiguously resolve whether private arbitral panels are included in the 
specific sense in which the term is used here.”). 
12. See Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 109 (noting that the court’s prior decision in NBC that Section 1782(a) did 
not broadly encompass private commercial arbitration was still good law); NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 
F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that other opinions, primarily from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, showed that “not 
every conceivable fact-finding or adjudicative body is covered . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693 
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not have enacted a statute providing broader discovery rights to international arbitration 
than it would for domestic arbitration cases.13 Finally, the three appellate courts opposed 
to Section 1782(a)’s use in private international arbitration all argue Section 1782(a) would 
be in direct conflict with Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).14 Meanwhile, 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have constructed logically sound arguments to dismiss each 
of these in turn to justify their endorsement of Section 1782(a).15  
For the reasons explained in Section Three of this article, the possibility of this 
issue coming before the Supreme Court is exceedingly high given the recent conflicting 
outcomes of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.16 If the Supreme Court decides that Section 
1782(a)’s “foreign or international tribunals” phrasing does not include the term 
arbitration, then participants involved in the international arbitration realm will gain the 
ability to block broader discovery.17 However, if the Supreme Court decides Section 
1782(a)’s phrasing does apply, then international public policy will be upheld. Despite 
these fears that the arbitral system will come to a screeching halt, the process of 
international arbitration will carry on like normal.18 
 
(“All definitions agree that the word ‘tribunal’ means ‘a court,’ but some are more expansive, leaving room 
for both competing interpretations”).  
13. See NBC 165 F.3d at 191 (noting that allowing large amounts of discovery to occur in private arbitration 
of “foreign tribunals” as compared to the breadcrumbs of discovery allowed for domestic arbitration would 
be “devoid of principle.”); see also Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (“It is not likely that Congress would 
have chosen to authorize federal courts to assure broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration than 
is afforded its domestic dispute-resolution counterpart.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (stating it would 
be irrational for “litigants in foreign arbitrations [to] . . . have access to much more expansive discovery than 
litigants in domestic arbitrations.”).  
14. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188 (noting that if a broad interpretation of Section 1782(a) were adopted the court 
would have to decide whether Section 1782(a) or Section 7 of the FAA would be “exclusive,” however, since 
the issue wasn’t reached no ruling was made by the court); Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (stating “there 
is . . . a possibility that Federal Arbitration Act § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1782 conflict . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 
975 F.3d at 695 (“Reading § 1782(a) broadly to apply to all private foreign arbitrations creates a direct 
conflict with the [FAA] for this subset of foreign arbitrations.”).  
15. See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.  
16. Both Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. out of the Fouth Circuit and Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC 
out of the Seventh Circuit stem from the same petitioner. However, the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have reached drastically different conclusions. The Fourth Circuit held that Section 1782(a) allows 
discovery to be compelled in private international arbitration while the Seventh Circuit held it does not. This 
creates a large issue because the motion for discovery came from the same private international arbitration 
agreement, leaving an unworkable outcome. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 
2020); Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2020). 
17. See generally Elizabeth B. Sandza & Lindsay M. Bethea, U.S. Court Assistance with Foreign Arbitration 
Discovery: Should it, Will It, Be Allowed?, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jul. 30, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-court-assistance-foreign-arbitration-discovery-should-it-will-it-
be-allowed.   
18. See An Act to establish a Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial 
Procedure, 85 P.L. 906, 72 Stat. 1743 (leading up to the 1964 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, Congress 
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III. BRIEF OVERVIEW: WHAT CAUSED THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
A. Pre-Intel Decisions by the Second and Fifth Circuits 
 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co. was 
the first appellate court to conclude that “Congress did not intend for [28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)] 
to apply to an arbitral body established by private parties.”19 NBC had entered an 
agreement with the broadcast company Azteca that was subject to arbitration of disputes 
under the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).20 After the agreement fell through, 
NBC applied for discovery under Section 1782(a), which the district court granted.21 
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.22 The court determined that 
Section 1782(a)’s use of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” was ambiguous, 
leading it to look to legislative history for a definition.23 The court reasoned that Congress 
did not intend for the statute to apply to private arbitration.24 Finally, the appellate court 
noted “the type of discovery sought by NBC . . . would undermine one of the significant 
advantages of arbitration, and thus arguably conflict with the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration . . . .”25 
The next court to make a ruling on Section 1782(a)’s use in private arbitration was 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l.26 In 
Biedermann, the Fifth Circuit also reasoned that the term “tribunal” was vague and that 
 
created a commission to “examine judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign 
Countries . . . .”); See also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004) (noting 
that legislative history shows Congress created the 1958 Committee in response to how quickly transnational 
business was growing). Additionally, any worry that permitting discovery under Section 1782(a) will result 
in slower arbitration and excess costs fails to consider the discretion provided to district court judges as laid 
out in the Supreme Court’s Intel decision. Id. at 262; infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
19. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191. 
20. See id. at 186. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 191. 
23. Id. at 188 (“In our view, the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ is sufficiently ambiguous that it does 
not necessarily include or exclude the arbitral panel at issue here.”). 
24. See NBC 165 F.3d at 190 (noting that the court believes Congress would have expressly mentioned 
arbitral panels created by private parties if it intended to lend “American judicial assistance”).  
25. Id. at 191.  
26. See Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 880. 
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Congress did not intend for it to encompass arbitration.27 Further, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that permitting Section 1782(a) to apply to private foreign arbitration would provide 
broader discovery in international arbitration than is permitted in domestic arbitration in 
the United States.28 For those reasons, the court reversed, leaving the issue largely 
undisputed until the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 
Inc.29  
 
B. The Supreme Court and Intel 
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel did not specifically 
deal with private foreign international arbitration; rather, it handled an issue arising from a 
foreign investigation commission seeking documents through Section 1782(a).30 While the 
Court answered three questions in Intel, it was the first that caused the current circuit split 
based upon the Court’s interpretation of the word “tribunal.”31 The first question answered 
by the Court, and the only one relevant in this article, was whether Section 1782(a) 
“contains a foreign-discoverability requirement.”32  
On this question, the Supreme Court held that there was no foreign-discoverability 
requirement contained in Section 1782(a).33 The Court reasoned that the text of Section 
1782(a) did not “limit[] a district court's production-order authority to materials that could 
be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there.”34 The Court 
also noted that concerns of equality between litigating parties do not justify the absolute 
bar to the discovery process that a foreign-discoverability requirement would impose.35 
 
27. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 882 (“[T]he term ‘tribunal’ lacks precision . . . . ‘Tribunal’ has been held 
not to include even certain types of fact-finding proceedings . . . .”). 
28. See id. at 883.  
29. Intel, 542 U.S. at 246.  
30. See generally id. at 246-247 (the Supreme Court’s Intel decision dealt with whether Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc. was permitted to seek documents through 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to use in a European antitrust 
proceeding it had initiated).   
31. Id. at 258 (quoting Smit, International Litigation, supra note 6, at 1026-27) (“‘[t]he term “tribunal” . . . 
includes . . . administrative and arbitral tribunals . . . .’”). 
32. Id. at 259-60 (“Does § 1782(a) categorically bar a district court from ordering production of documents 
when the foreign tribunal or the ‘interested person’ would not be able to obtain the documents if they were 
located in the foreign jurisdiction?”).  
33. See id. at 253. 
34. Intel, 542 U.S. at 260. 
35. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 262 (reasoning that concerns of equality among parties are remedied by the district 
courts’ wide-ranging discretion, which would permit it to “condition relief upon that person's reciprocal 
exchange of information.” Additionally, the court notes that a foreign tribunal would still maintain the 
freedom to reject any information gained by a party under Section 1782(a) stating “foreign tribunal[‘s] can 
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Additionally, the Court made two points before laying out the factors for a district 
court to consider when receiving a request under Section 1782(a). First, the Court noted 
that district courts may lend assistance in discovering relevant materials to the complainant 
but are not required to.36 Second, the Court expressly rebuked the contention that materials 
sought should only be permitted for discovery if discovery would be allowed in an 
equivalent domestic proceeding.37 Finally, the Court laid out the factors for a district court 
to consider when determining whether to permit a complainant to proceed under Section 
1782(a). The first factor to consider is whether “the person from whom discovery is sought 
is a participant in the foreign proceeding . . .  the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as 
apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter 
arising abroad.”38 The second factor to contemplate is the “nature of the foreign tribunal, 
[and] the character of the proceedings . . . .”39 Third, the courts should examine whether 
the request of documents through Section 1782 is “an attempt to circumvent . . . proof-
gathering restrictions . . . .”40 The fourth factor lower courts should consider is that requests 
which are extremely burdensome “may be rejected or trimmed.”41 
 
C. Post-Intel Decisions:  
 
1. The Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal Go Against the Grain 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel, there was a fifteen-year period of 
silence on whether Section 1782(a) applied to private international arbitration. The first 
court to add to the circuit split was the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Abdul Latif 
Jameel Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp. decision.42 In Abdul Latif Jameel 
Transportation Co., the dispute was triggered by allegations of material misrepresentations 
within an international contract, leading to arbitration proceedings.43 Since FedEx 
 
place conditions on [their] acceptance of the information to maintain whatever measure of parity it concludes 
is appropriate.”). 
36. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 255 (“The statute authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide 
assistance to a complainant . . . .”). 
37. See id. at 263 (noting that Section 1782(a) does not call for this comparison to be made, and that 
“[c]omparisons of that order can be fraught with danger”).  
38. Id. at 264. 
39. Id. 
40. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. 
41. Id.  
42. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 714-16. 
43. See generally id. at 714-15. 
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Corporation is headquartered in the U.S., Abdul Latif Jameel Transport Company (“ALJ”) 
filed for discovery under Section 1782(a), which the district court denied.44    
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the 
arbitral panel was a “tribunal” under Section 1782(a).45 The court reasoned that, since 
Section 1782(a) was non-mandatory, it did not detract from the speedy dispute resolution 
sought by parties in arbitration.46 The Sixth Circuit then determined that the legal use of 
the term “tribunal” supported a broad interpretation and that the congressional context of 
Section 1782(a) did not suggest otherwise.47  
Several months after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that Section 1782(a) encompasses international 
arbitral panels in Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. (“Servotronics I”).48 Servotronics I 
involved a dispute over a settlement resulting from a faulty Servotronics part within a 
Rolls-Royce engine that caused damage to a Boeing aircraft.49 Unable to reach an 
agreement, the parties’ arbitration clause took effect, which was followed by Servotronics 
filing for discovery under Section 1782(a) “to obtain testimony” from several employees 
who were located where the accident had occurred.50 However, the district court rejected 
Servotronics’ application for aid under Section 1782(a).51  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court holding “the 
UK arbitral panel [that] convened to address the dispute . . . is a ‘foreign or international 
tribunal’ under § 1782(a) and . . . the district court has authority to provide . . . 
assistance . . . .”52 The court rejected several arguments put forward by Boeing, the first of 
which was that “tribunal” only included “entit[ies] that exercise[] government-conferred 
authority.”53 The court reasoned, based on Congress’s enactment of the FAA and judicial 
support for arbitration, that arbitration is considered a “government-conferred authority” 
 
44. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 716. 
45. Id. at 716. 
46. See id. 730 (“[A] district court can limit or reject ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome’ discovery requests.”). 
47. See id. at 719-23 (following thorough analysis of legislative history and definitions the court concluded 
“the text, context, and structure of § 1782(a) provide no reason to doubt that the word ‘tribunal’ includes 
private commercial arbitral panels established pursuant to contract . . . .”). 
48. See Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 216. 
49. See id. at 210. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. at 210-11. 
52. Id. at 216. 
53. Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 213. 
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within the United States.54 Further, the court reasoned that Section 1782(a)’s application 
would not affect the core advantages parties bargain for in arbitration agreements since 
discovery under Section 1782(a) is far less broad than what the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure would permit.55 Finally, the court addressed the argument that Section 1782(a) 
would effectively undermine the FAA by permitting broader discovery.56 In response, the 
court stated that under Section 1782(a), “a district court functions effectively as a surrogate 
for a foreign tribunal . . . . When viewed in this light, the district court functions no 
differently than . . . an American arbitral panel.”57 
 
2. The Second Circuit Doubles Down and The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals Decides Against Section 1782(a)  
 
July of 2020 provided the Second Circuit an opportunity to re-establish and 
strengthen its position on Section 1782(a) in Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec.58 In 
Hanwei Guo, the Second Circuit primarily discussed how their opinion in NBC was still 
good law considering the Supreme Court’s Intel decision.59 Here, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that the refusal in NBC to “read such a sweeping expansion into the statute in the 
absence of clear statutory language . . . or congressional intent [was] consistent with . . . 
Intel.”60 
 
54. Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 214 (after describing the overall nature of the FAA’s enactment the court 
summarizes stating “arbitration in the United States is a congressionally endorsed and regulated process that 
is judicially supervised. . . . Thus, contrary to [the] . . . assertion that arbitration is not a product of 
‘government-conferred authority,’ under U.S. law, it clearly is.”).  
55. Id. at 215 (rebutting the argument that discovery under Section 1782(a) would strip arbitration of its 
benefits the court stated, “the process must be administered in the discretion of the district court — not the 
parties, as is the case in discovery — to assist in the limited role of receiving evidence for use in the foreign 
tribunal proceeding.”). 
56. See id. (“Boeing . . . expresses concern that applying §1782(a) . . . would ‘create a conflict with the FAA 
by authorizing discovery that the FAA does not contemplate,’ . . . . Specifically, . . . that applying §1782(a) 
would broaden ‘discovery’ or access to information in foreign arbitrations to an extent not available in U.S. 
arbitrations . . . .”). 
57. Id. at 215 (emphasis in original). 
58. See generally Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 104-05 (stating that the courts previous holding in, NBC,165 
F.3d, is still good law and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
542 U.S. 241 (2004) did not overrule the court’s prior opinion).  
59. See id. at 104-07 (holding that the court’s prior decision in NBC, 165 F.3d was not overturned). 
60. Id. at 106; but see Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: 
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'I L. & COM 1, 5 (1998) (“The substitution 
of the word ‘tribunal’ for ‘court’ was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for 
available to all bodies with adjudicatory functions. Clearly, private arbitral tribunals come within the term 
the drafters used.”). 
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion about Section 1782(a) 
dealing with the same factual background as Servotronics I. This dispute arose from 
Servotronics applying for Section 1782(a) to a district court in Illinois, where Boeing is 
headquartered.61 While the subpoena sought by Servotronics was initially granted, Rolls-
Royce interjected and the district court granted a motion to quash the subpoena on the 
grounds that Section 1782(a) was not permitted for use in a private foreign arbitration 
setting.62 
Servotronics appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
judgment, joining the Second and Fifth Circuits in concluding that “§ 1782(a) does not 
authorize the district courts to compel discovery for use in private foreign arbitrations.”63 
The court began by examining the definition of the term “tribunal” before determining 
dictionaries to be of no aid and turning to statutory context.64 The Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that Congress’s creation of a 1958 committee, tasked to investigate judicial cooperation 
between the U.S. and other countries,65 supported a narrow interpretation of the phrase 
“foreign or international tribunal.”66 Finally, the court discussed how interpreting Section 
1782(a) to apply to private arbitration would permit unfairly expansive discovery when 
compared with domestic arbitration,67 and place it in conflict with the FAA.68  
 
61. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 691. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. at 696. 
64. Id. at 692-95. 
65. See id. at 694 (“The Commission shall investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and 
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.”) 
(quoting Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, 1743).  
66. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 694-95 (noting that the instructions for creating the 1958 committee did not 
include “recommend[ing] improvements in judicial assistance to private foreign arbitration.” The court then 
reasoned that because the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” is used in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696 and 1781, 
which “are matters of comity between governments” this lends aid to the court’s interpretation that Section 
1782(a)’s use of the phrase should not encompass arbitration so as to be in harmony with these statutes).  
67. See id. at 695 (“It's hard to conjure a rationale for giving parties to private foreign arbitrations such broad 
access to federal-court discovery assistance in the United States while precluding such discovery assistance 
for litigants in domestic arbitrations.”); but see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 
246 (2004) (“The Court . . . rejects [the] suggestion that a § 1782(a) applicant must show that United States 
law would allow discovery in domestic litigation analogous to the foreign proceeding. Section 1782 is a 
provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative 
analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught 
with danger.”) (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at 695-96 (stating that “the FAA permits the arbitration panel—but not the parties—to [seek 
discovery] . . . .” and that because “the FAA applies to some foreign arbitrations under implementing 
legislation for the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards . . . .” a broad 




IV. WHY SECTION 1782(A) SHOULD APPLY TO FOREIGN ARBITRATION 
 
Given that some of the core benefits of arbitration sought by parties are lower costs 
and expeditious proceedings,69 it is understandable that concerns arise when the possibility 
of expansive discovery in arbitration is mentioned. This section of the article will break 
down the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. The section begins with a 
discussion on why these Circuits have misinterpreted the statutory history regarding 
Section 1782(a) and laying out how the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” 
encompasses arbitral tribunals. Next, a rebuttal will be provided for the arguments that 
arbitral panels’ inclusion as a tribunal will cause unequal discovery between domestic and 
international arbitration. Finally, this section will conclude by explaining that Section 
1782(a)’s encompassing of arbitration panels aligns with the emphatic federal policy 
favoring arbitration and will have no detrimental effect on the operation of private 
international arbitration.  
 
A. The Second Fifth and Seventh Circuits Misinterpret Statutory History 
 
When the text of a statute is unclear, courts will engage in statutory interpretation 
in an attempt to decode Congress’s intent at the point in time it enacted the law.70 
Discerning the true meaning of any statute that is over half a century old is not an easy 
task, which may explain why the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all concluded that the 
legislative history showed Section 1782(a) was not meant to apply to private foreign 
arbitration.71 However, despite the inability of these courts to come to a definite conclusion 
on the legislative history, they all chose to gloss over one important scholar, Hans Smit.72 
 
69. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 4 (“[A]rbitral adjudication . . . is expeditious, efficient, economical, 
effective, and enforceable.”). 
70. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co.,939 F.3d at 717 (6th Cir. 2019) (“‘In determining the meaning of a 
statutory provision, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning. . . .’ And 
ordinary meaning is to be determined retrospectively . . . .”) (quoting Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. 
Ct. 594, 603(2018)). 
71. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding Section 1782 did not encompass 
private arbitration after admitting that the legislative history and committees noted the “word ‘tribunal’ is 
used to make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts . . . .”) (internal 
citations omitted); Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 102 ; Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d (after reviewing legislative 
history “elect[ing] to follow the Second Circuit[] . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (concluding 
legislative history suggests a narrow reading of Section 1782). 
72. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n. 6 (acknowledging that the Senate Report relied on Hans Smit’s work in 
1962, and that Hans Smit also released a work later in life where he discussed the congressional intent at the 
time, but declined to find it persuasive); Biederman Int’l, 168 F.3d at 882, n. 5 (stating “[t]here is no 
contemporaneous evidence that Congress contemplated extending § 1782 to the then-novel arena of 
international commercial arbitration,” but then commenting in note five that Hans Smit, one of the individuals 
who helped the Committee draft changes to Section 1782, recounted that “private commercial arbitrations 
are within §1782.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 696 (writing off the Supreme Court’s own noting of Hans 
Smit’s inclusion of arbitral tribunals within Section 1782 because it occurred in a  “explanatory parenthetical” 
and “[t]here is no indication that ‘arbitral tribunals’ includes private arbitral tribunals.”) (emphasis in 
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Hans Smit is perhaps the most insightful source to discover the legislative intent of 
the 1964 amendments to Section 1782(a).73 While it is conceded that secondary authorities 
should be given less weight than that which Congress explicitly states or what a court rules 
are the proper interpretations of the law, the disagreement over Section 1782(a) presents a 
unique case.74 Further, while Hans Smit’s opinions on their own likely are not dispositive 
of the issue, the Supreme Court’s reference to Hans Smit’s work should add considerable 
weight to them. While it is true that the Court referred to Hans Smit in a parenthetical 
explanation, this cursory glance is not nearly enough to close the investigation.75 Intel was 
a Supreme Court decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the same Justice who had previously 
referred to Hans Smit as the “dominant drafter” of Section 1782 and its amendments.76 
Therefore, it seems likely that the Supreme Court, having relied on Hans Smit’s 
interpretations previously, would give deference to them again should the occasion arise.  
Next, the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” should be interpreted to 
encompass private international arbitration for two reasons. First, having established Hans 
Smit’s importance in aiding Congress’s 1964 amendments to Section 1782, his comments 
should be viewed as closely aligned with congressional intent at the time. This point is 
further exemplified by Hans Smit’s law review article published just a year after the 1964 
amendments, which states “[t]he term tribunal encompasses all bodies that have 
adjudicatory power, and is intended to include . . . arbitral tribunals or single arbitrators.”77 
Additionally, Hans Smit’s immediate and detailed release of comments and background 
purpose on the 1964 amendments strikes directly against the Second Circuit’s claim that 
“Professor Smit's recent article does not purport to rely upon any special knowledge 
concerning legislative intent . . . .”78 Second, it is important to note that Congress removed 
 
original); but see CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 2 (“[A]rbitration is generally private and confidential. 
Arbitral proceedings are not open to the public . . . . The recourse to arbitration, therefore allows commercial 
parties to maintain their commercial reputation . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
73. See Hans Smit, Article: American Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 8 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 153, 154 (1997) (“My role in the development of the measures that were adopted by Congress 
has led both courts and commentators to place heavy reliance on my published writings in this area.”). 
74. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all refuse to provide any authoritative weight to Hans Smit’s 
work or comments on the Amendments to Section 1782(a). Accord Biederman Int’l, 168 F.3d at 882, n.5. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit notion that Hans Smit did not adopt his opinion on whether “tribunal” is 
included within Section 1782 for nearly three decades is patently false. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n.6. Hans 
Smit had supported this assertion in his 1965 Columbia law review article which states, “The new legislation 
also authorizes assistance in aid of international arbitral tribunals.” Hans Smit, International arbitration, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 1015, n.73.  
75. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258. 
76. In Re Letter of Request From the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom (Ward), 870 F. 2d 
686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Smit, supra note 73, at 154. 
77. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 5, at 1021. 
78. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n.6; see also Smit, supra note 73, at 154. 
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restrictive verbiage when making their 1964 amendments to Section 1782.79 While it is 
true that not every deleted word was explained, many of the removals were explained in a 
Senate Report after the Section 1782 amendments became law.80 With such broad language 
being recognized by the then-contemporary Senate, the legislative history seems to suggest 
that arbitral tribunals would be encompassed within Section 1782.81 It would be quite a 
discrepancy for Congress to specifically note that it did not want the proceedings confined 
to conventional courts only to then exclude a quasi-judicial proceeding such as 
arbitration.82 
 
B. Irrelevant Discovery Arguments and a Harmonious Relationship with the FAA 
 
It is undisputed that there are major differences between domestic arbitration within 
the United States and international commercial arbitration.83 In fact, these differences can 
be rather substantial, ranging from initiation of arbitration to discovery.84 These differences 
should alert the courts to the notion that, while international arbitration is similar to its 
domestic cousin, it is in a different category, and the two should not be compared for a 
variety of reasons.  
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all relied heavily on the notion that 
permitting Section 1782(a) to encompass private international arbitration would unfairly 
permit more discovery to occur than is allowed in domestic arbitration.85 However, the 
 
79. See Intel 542 U.S. at 248-49 (noting that “Congress deleted the words ‘in any judicial proceeding pending 
in any court in a foreign country,’ and replaced them with the phrase ‘in a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal.’”).  
80. See id. at 249 (discussing how the Senate Report “explains that Congress introduced the word ‘tribunal’ 
to ensure that ‘assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts,’ but extends also to 
‘administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964)). 
81. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 728 (“The facts on which the legislative history is most 
clear are that the substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judicial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the statute . . . .”). 
82. See id. (“[T]he legislative history does not indicate that the expansion stopped short of private arbitration. 
. . .”); Intel 542 U.S. at 249. 
83. See generally Daniel B. Swaja, Global Construction Disputes – Basics on U.S. Domestic Versus 
International Arbitration (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publi
cations/under_construction/2019/spring/domestic-versus-international-arbitration/. This article highlights 
the primary differences between domestic and international arbitration ranging from cost savings being 
magnified, to different discovery processes. To remain transparent, it is conceded by this author that this 
source notes “[d]iscovery tends to be much more limited in international arbitration than in U.S. domestic 
arbitration.” However, extending the discovery aid of Section 1782 will still comport with established 
standards and is further discussed below.  
84. See Albert Bates Jr. & R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Internationalizing Domestic Arbitration: How 
International Arbitration Practices Can Improve Domestic Construction Arbitration, 74 DIS. RES. J., no. 3, 
Jun. 2020, at 8-16, 22-26. 
85. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (“[B]road discovery . . . before ‘foreign or international’ private arbitrators 
would stand in stark contrast to . . . domestic arbitration panels . . . .”); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann 
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rationale put forward by the appellate courts is explicitly rebutted by the Supreme Court in 
Intel.86 The Supreme Court went so far as to warn the lower courts that “[c]omparisons of 
that order can be fraught with danger.”87 Such comparisons are improper primarily due to 
the extensive differences that typically exist between international and domestic 
arbitration. For example, it is common for international arbitration to be a front-loaded 
process with specific pleadings that are more customary in civil law.88 Furthermore, the 
very nature of “discovery” in international arbitration is typically a limited process.89 The 
Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits would all likely consider the limited nature of 
discovery in international arbitration to aid their reasoning.90  
However, the lack of allowable discovery should begin to ease appellate court fears 
that international arbitration will allow parties to engage in excessively more discovery 
than domestic arbitration. This argument is bolstered by the fact that the initial pleadings 
phase of international arbitration allows disputing parties to pinpoint exactly what 
documents they need to obtain, if any.91 Should the parties seek aid under Section 1782(a), 
it will likely only be to obtain previously identified documents or witness statements.92 
Thus, the suggestion by the Second and Fifth Circuits that parties will self-destruct into 
overindulgent discovery-seeking saboteurs if Section 1782(a) were read to encompass 
international arbitration, does not seem likely to occur.93  
 
Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (“It is not likely that Congress . . . authorize[d] federal courts to assure 
broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration than is afforded its domestic dispute-resolution 
counterpart.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (stating it would be irrational to give “private foreign 
arbitrations . . . broad access to federal-court discovery . . . while precluding such discovery assistance . . . in 
domestic arbitrations”). 
86. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 263 (noting “[Section 1782(a)] does not direct . . . courts to engage in comparative 
analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here.”); see also Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 
939 F.3d at 729. 
87. Intel, 542 U.S. at 263. 
88. See Bates Jr., supra note 84, at 15 (noting that early “particularized pleadings” typically negate the need 
for long excessive discovery that can be found in regular litigation, and sometimes in domestic U.S. 
arbitration).  
89. Id. at 23. (“[G]iven the prominent influence of civil law legal traditions in international arbitration, it is 
well accepted, . . . that expansive document disclosure (like that seen in the United States) is inappropriate in 
international arbitration.”); See also Swaja, supra note 83 (“Discovery tends to be much more limited in 
international arbitration than in U.S. domestic arbitration.”). 
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
91. See Bates Jr., supra note 84, at 15 (“[B]ecause the parties have already laid out their cases in detail and 
supplied much of their supporting evidence, the parties are typically better able to understand what the crucial 
issues . . . are and what additional documentary evidence they require. . . .”). 
92. Id. 
93. Compare NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (implying that parties to arbitration will take advantage of and destroy 




C. Including Arbitration Under Section 1782(a) Comports with the Emphatic 
Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration 
 
Finally, for any rule or interpretation of arbitration to stand the test of time, it is 
important that it aligns with the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration. The Second 
Circuit has reasoned that permitting private international arbitral tribunals to seek 
discovery under Section 1782(a) would “conflict with the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”94 However, the Second Circuit’s 
contention does not withstand scrutiny when examined next to the Supreme Court’s history 
of favoring arbitration, or while examining Section 1782(a) within the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s Intel decision. 
To begin, it may be said that actively attempting to narrow Section 1782(a) is a 
direct strike against the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.95 Thus, the arguments 
by the appellate courts, such as broader discovery being permitted than in domestic 
arbitration, seem hostile to international arbitration,96 a procedure with major differences 
from its domestic counterpart.97 Next, the Supreme Court’s factors in Intel aid the idea that  
Section 1782(a)’s inclusion of arbitral tribunals furthers the policy favoring arbitration.98  
The first factor comports with ensuring the arbitral process can run successfully because, 
 
one of the significant advantages of arbitration[] . . . .”); and Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (“Empowering 
arbitrators or, worse, the parties, in private international disputes to seek ancillary discovery through the 
federal courts does not benefit the arbitration process. . . . Resort[ing] to § 1782 in the teeth of such 
agreements suggests a party's attempt to manipulate United States court processes for tactical advantage.”); 
with Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 262 (noting that should the district court permit discovery under Section 1782(a) 
“the foreign tribunal . . . [could] place conditions on its acceptance of the information to maintain whatever 
measure of parity it concludes is appropriate.”); and Smit, supra note 73, at 156 (“[I]nternational tribunals 
are . . . free to shape their procedures. . . . This means . . . [the parties] can ask for assistance from an American 
court only when the arbitral tribunal has ruled this to be permissible.”). 
94. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191. 
95. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (“Congress directed courts to abandon their 
hostility and instead treat arbitration agreements as ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’ . . . The Act, this 
Court has said, establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”). 
96. See Smit, supra note 73, at 161 (“[P]recluding any recourse to Section 1782 by a private foreign or 
international arbitral tribunal reflects an attitude hostile to international arbitration that is at odds with the 
legislatively and judicially repeatedly expressed favor of arbitration as a socially desirable alternative form 
of dispute settlement.”). 
97. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
98. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at  264-65 (“First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a 
participant in the foreign proceeding . . . the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily 
is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad. . . . Second, . . . a court . . . may 
take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings . . ., and the receptivity 
of the foreign government or the court or agency . . . . [Third], a district court [may] consider whether the § 
1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent . . . proof-gathering restrictions . . . [Fourth], unduly 
intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.”). 
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as the Court states, “nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign 
tribunal's jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be 
unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.”99 The second factor of Intel further ensures the policy 
favoring arbitration is upheld because it permits the district courts to look to the type of 
proceeding before it while considering how to apply Section 1782(a), rather than being 
forced to blindly grant all requests.100 Intel’s third factor provides the district court further 
discretion by allowing the court to examine whether the requesting party is trying to 
undermine the proceeding it is involved in, and if so, the court may deny the request.101 
This allows the arbitral process to be preserved by preventing parties from engaging in acts 
that may diminish the reliability of arbitration. Finally, Intel’s fourth factor directly aligns 
with the idea that arbitration is meant to be an expedited cost-effective process by 
permitting courts to outright deny requests that are “unduly intrusive or burdensome.”102 
V. CONCLUSION  
Arbitration, whether domestic or international, is supposed to be an expeditious 
cost-effective procedure when compared to traditional litigation. Nevertheless, these 
attributes still apply when reading Section 1782(a) to include private international 
commercial arbitration. As discussed, Section 1782(a) has an immense number of 
safeguards ranging from the discretion of district courts in approving the request to the 
parties’ own reluctance to strike against the arbitral panel. Further, having access to 
documents potentially guaranteeing accurate results within the arbitral process is 
imperative if companies and parties are to continue utilizing arbitration to resolve their 
disputes. The ability to block relevant documents from being discovered through Section 
1782(a) simply because it will permit more discovery than is allowed in domestic 
arbitration not only has nationalistic undertones but will also end up undermining the 
national policy favoring arbitration that the Supreme Court has sought to bolster. In closing, 
the legislative history, congressional intent, and Supreme Court precedent in Intel all 
support Section 1782 permitting discovery in private international arbitration.  
 
99. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. 
100. See id. 
101. Id. at 265. 
102. Id. 
